Heritage Foundation Leadership for America

For more than a decade, the U.S. Navy has invested significant time and resources in designing a multipurpose destroyer, the DDG-1000 Zumwalt, to provide superior naval surface fire support, area anti-air warfare, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the littorals.

However, during testimony on July 31, 2008, Navy leaders rescinded their support for the Presi­dent's fiscal year (FY) 2009 budget request for a third DDG-1000 and advocated "truncating" the program. Navy officials insisted that the Zumwalt was no longer the best ship for the Navy due to a shifting security environment and a host of emerg­ing weapons capabilities. Instead of procuring seven DDG-1000s, the Navy wants to purchase only three and to procure at least eight additional, upgraded DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers.

In the FY 2009 defense appropriations bill, Con­gress has provided funding to keep both options open for the next Administration. Before making any major decisions about the future of the Navy's major surface combatant fleet in 2010, Congress needs to ask a series of questions that deserve straightforward answers from the Navy.

Zumwalt vs. Arleigh Burke. The DDG-1000 and DDG-51 are both considered multimission destroyers because their different weapons systems make them more suited to different missions. The DDG-51 was designed during the Cold War to pro­vide Aegis-based area air defense to aircraft carrier battle groups against Soviet naval bombers armed with anti-ship supersonic cruise missiles. The Arleigh Burke Flight IIA class carries two helicop­ters, and its sonar system is designed for littoral and open-ocean ASW operations.

The DDG-1000 is designed to conduct anti-sub­marine warfare operations in littoral waters, has a significantly smaller radar cross section, and can provide improved naval surface fire support for the Marine Corps. The DDG-1000 also offers the capa­bility to support Special Operations Forces, a full range of rotary-wing aircraft, and a larger class of support boats. It will require 50 percent fewer per­sonnel and generate 78 megawatts of electrical power, compared to the DDG-51's 7.5 megawatts.

These advanced capabilities explain why Chair­man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen said that the DDG-51 constitutes "mov­ing…back to the 1980's technology."

Questions Congress Needs to Ask. Congress needs answers from the Navy to the following eight sets of questions, both to guide its oversight and to inform its funding decisions:

1. If the DDG-1000 cannot conduct area air defense, why is it classified as a guided missile destroyer? Could the DDG-1000 be upgraded to employ the Standard Missile? What are the growth potential and cost of the DDG-1000's Dual-Band Radar and combat management sys­tem for ballistic missile defense?
   
   
2. What are the Marine Corps' specific naval sur­face fire-support requirements? Can they be met sufficiently without the planned seven DDG-1000s?
   
   
3. Is the Navy's decision-making process being driven mostly by budget restraints or by changes in the threat assessment and requirements?
   
   
4. If China's military capabilities are such a signifi­cant factor in the Navy's decision-making pro­cess, why did the Navy avoided discussing China in its recent Maritime Strategy?
   
   
5. What are the growth potentials of Zumwalt and Arleigh Burke classes in terms of adding new systems, weapons (e.g., lasers), and combat capabilities?
   
   
6. What are the design flaws, if any, in hull strength and/or weapon locations?
   
   
7. What are the life cycle costs of adding new sys­tems and combat capabilities?
   
   
8. Has the projected timeline for procuring the CG(X), the next generation lead cruiser, slipped from 2011 to 2015 or later? If so, what is the Navy's specific plan for cruiser procurement, particularly in light of its concern about anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles?

The Burden Remains on the Navy's Leader­ship. During the long and somewhat turbulent history of the Zumwalt program, the Navy has con­tinuously supported the ship while expanding its capabilities and reducing its numbers. After years of justifying its requirements, the Navy has reversed direction and is arguing that its future multimission destroyer is no longer the answer to the threats that the service may face in the future.

Recent testimony by Vice Admiral Barry McCullough and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Ship Programs Allison Stiller has raised new questions and left other concerns unanswered. The Navy's leadership has an obligation to provide Congress with full answers to these questions in a timely manner. Before deciding which plan to fund in 2010, Congress should demand the information that it needs to conduct due diligence.

Mackenzie M. Eaglen is Senior Policy Analyst for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Eric Sayers, a Heritage Foundation research assistant, and Lajos Szaszdi, Ph.D., contributed to this paper.