MYTH: The only way to increase child care spending is for Congress to appropriate new funds and increase costs for the taxpayer.
FACT: Child care spending has increased dramatically since 1996, and two-thirds of new child care spending has come from savings in the TANF program due to welfare reform.
Advocates of increased spending for child care often assume that any increase in government funding for child care must entail congressional authorization and appropriation of new child care funding. For example, during the debate over TANF reauthorization in the House of Representatives earlier this year, liberals universally argued that if Congress wanted more welfare recipients to work, it would have to authorize and appropriate additional child care spending.
On the surface, this argument appears plausible. Clearly, if more single mothers move off welfare and into the labor market, the government will need to spend more on child care. However, experience demonstrates that increased child care spending does not require new congressional appropriations. Instead, most increases in government child care spending have come and will continue to come from the fiscal savings generated by welfare reform itself.
For example, in 1996 when Congress passed welfare reform, the federal and state governments together spent $3.2 billion on child care. By 2002, child care spending had risen to $11 billion--an increase of $7.8 billion in annual spending. However, as Chart 3 shows, only $2.2 billion of this spending increase came from new funding that was authorized and appropriated by Congress. The remaining $5.6 billion came from savings in the TANF funding that had been redirected into child care subsidies.
Overall, in the six years since Congress passed welfare reform, child care spending has increased by $27.9 billion. Of that, some 75 percent ($21 billion) came from TANF savings. By contrast, only 25 percent ($6.9 billion) came from new congressional appropriations.
How did welfare reform generate savings in the TANF program that could be used to pay for child care? The mechanism was simple: The reform required an increasing share of TANF recipients to obtain jobs or prepare for work. These "work" requirements led to a dramatic reduction in TANF caseloads as recipients left welfare and entered employment; since 1996, the TANF caseload has been cut in half. As the TANF caseloads fell, the amount states spent on monthly cash TANF payments decreased proportionately. States were permitted to retain unspent TANF funds and redirect them to other purposes, including child care subsidies. The result has been an increase of $21 billion in child care spending without any increased cost to the taxpayer.
Contrary to claims made by opponents of welfare reform, new federal appropriations for child care are not needed to intensify or expand reform. If the work requirements in TANF are strengthened, the TANF caseload will fall again. This will generate even larger funding surpluses, which can be converted into increased child care subsidies.

MYTH: States use their discretion to set excessively strict eligibility standards, excluding millions of poor families from child care subsidies.
FACT: The average state covers working families with incomes up to 196 percent of the federal poverty level.
Members of Congress have consistently clung to a belief that states use strict eligibility standards to exclude poor working families from child care assistance. The numbers tell a different story. In 2001, eligibility standards for CCDF aid for a family of three ranged from a low of $18,048 in Alabama to a high of $47,586 in Connecticut. The average state set an upper eligibility standard at 196 percent of the federal poverty level, or $28,675 for a family of three, and 24 states granted eligibility to families with incomes at 200 percent of the federal poverty level or higher.
In addition to generous income standards, the other child care eligibility requirements that are unrelated to income are designed to be inclusive. Parents need only be engaged in some work, education, or training activities and have a child under the age of 13 (19 for disabled children). The family does not need to be a TANF participant, and TANF recipients need not count child care assistance against the program's five-year federal time limit for receiving support.
MYTH: Eligible poor families face lengthy waiting lists for child care assistance.
FACT: Nearly every eligible applicant with an income below the federal poverty line receives assistance.
Some critics of current child care policies acknowledge that states have liberal eligibility standards but assert that never-ending waiting lists freeze most eligible families out of child care assistance. In fact, however, two separate analyses that examined caseloads in 1999 and 2001 found that:
- 100 percent of all eligible TANF families who applied for child care subsidies were served.
- 100 percent of all eligible families leaving TANF who applied for child care subsidies were served, often for at least the following year.
- In 29 states, 100 percent of all eligible non-TANF families--many of whom earn over $30,000 annually--who applied for child care subsidies were served. Twenty-two states (including the District of Columbia) had either created waiting lists or frozen new non-TANF enrollment in at least one county. However, because most of the states with waiting lists have relatively high eligibility standards, it is likely that most families on waiting lists are middle-income rather than very poor.
In addition, analysts have suggested that some shortages be remedied by simply shifting excess child care funds from other counties or by shifting excess TANF child care funds to eligible non-TANF families. Most states have ample TANF funds that are spent on non-essential services and could be used to provide more child care if needed.
Overall, generous eligibility standards and an ability to serve increasing numbers of eligible families have allowed the number of children served to increase from 2 million in 1996 to 3.6 million in 2002. (See Chart 4.)

When examining the number of eligible children receiving subsidies, it is important to note that millions of eligible families who know about child care programs choose not to enroll their children in them. Child care caseworkers interviewed by HHS suggest that families have sufficient knowledge of these programs, and surveys show that as many as 90 percent of TANF recipients report knowledge of their own child care eligibility. Enrollment of children in school or a Head Start program, or informal child care arrangements with immediate family, neighbors, or other parents, often lead families to turn down public child care assistance. Government programs should not be considered failures simply because parents choose to use other child care arrangements.
MYTH: Child care subsidies are too small to make child care affordable.
FACT: The typical subsidized family at the poverty level pays just $11 per week for their child's care.
This myth is yet another example of the use of an outdated statistic that does not reflect current realities. A 1999 HHS study that reported that families in poverty with preschool children spend 18 percent of their income on child care was based on data from 1993--when child care funding was one-fifth of its current level.

A more recent study surveyed the co-payment policies and government rates for all 50 states to determine how much CCDF-enrolled families were paying for child care in 2001. The study found that the average three-person family with an income at the federal poverty level was paying a weekly co-payment of just $11 per child. To pay the child's $126 weekly bill to the child care facility, the local CCDF-funded program was funding the other $115. (See Chart 5.) On an annual basis, the CCDF pays $6,000 for the average enrolled child at the federal poverty level, while the family contributes just $567, or 4 percent of their gross income. Clearly, updated statistics tell a very different story than those from 1993.
At just $11 per week, it should come as no surprise that state and local child care offices report little difficulty in collecting these small co-payments and assert that their client families do not consider them a significant financial burden. Furthermore, because most states base co-payment rates more on family income than on child care facility costs, families are insulated from increasing prices or being forced to choose the least expensive care.
Conclusion
One of the goals of the 1996 welfare reform was to move single mothers off welfare and into employment. Since the enactment of reform, welfare caseloads have plummeted, employment of single mothers has soared, and the poverty rate of single mothers has dropped to the lowest point in national history.
Clearly, welfare reform and child care are linked. If low-skilled single mothers are moved into the labor force, child care assistance must be provided. But much of the public policy debate concerning child care is misleading. Government spending on child care has more than tripled since 1996. Most states now run broad child care subsidy programs that support families with incomes well above poverty.
If welfare reform is to continue and expand, additional funding for child care must be provided. However, as in the past, most of this funding should come from savings that reform has generated in the TANF program rather than from new congressional appropriations.
--Brian M. Riedl is Grover M. Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
Appendix
Funding Sources of the Child Care and Development Fund
As the primary source of child care expenditures, the CCDF receives funding from several different sources:
- The federal CCDF's discretionary and entitlement accounts, which are formula-based block grant to states.
- State maintenance-of-effort (MOE) child care spending, which is the minimum amount of their own money states must spend in order to receive federal support.
- The federal CCDF matching account, which states can access if they are willing to spend additional child care dollars of their own beyond the MOE requirement.
- State spending beyond the MOE requirement in order to receive additional federal CCDBG matching funds.
- States are permitted to transfer up to 30 percent of their TANF Block Grant to the CCDF.

Most states also spend a portion of their TANF block grant directly on child care without transferring it to the CCDF.
Classifying TANF and CCDF Spending
Throughout this paper, child care spending increases since 1996 have been classified as coming from TANF savings or from federal CCDF spending increases. To calculate these expenditures, Table 3 reclassifies each program from Table 2 as follows:
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The three 1996 federal programs were folded into the federal CCDF, and their spending levels are therefore compared with the federally funded CCDF-discretionary CCDF-entitlement expenditures. Since 1996, these expenditures have increased by $2.2 billion (as shown in Chart 3).
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The two 1996 state programs were folded into TANF, and their spending levels are therefore compared with TANF child care spending, whether it was spent directly on TANF child care, transferred to the CCDF, or raised by states to fund their portion of TANF. Since 1996, these expenditures have increased by $5.6 billion (as shown in Chart 3).
